The Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is a micro prudential instrument to strengthen the liquidity position of banks. However if in extreme scenarios the LCR becomes a binding constraint, the interaction of bank behaviour with the regulatory rule can have negative externalities. We simulate the systemic implications of the LCR by a liquidity stress-testing model, which takes into account the impact of bank reactions on second round feedback effects. We show that a flexible approach of the LCR, in particular one which recognises less liquid assets in the buffer, is a useful macroprudential instrument to mitigate its adverse side-effects during times of stress. At extreme stress levels the instrument becomes ineffective and the lender of last resort has to underpin the stability of the system.
Introduction
Liquidity regulation is an important element of the Basel III supervisory framework for banks. Two new liquidity standards, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), should improve banks' liquidity risk profile. By strengthening the resilience of banks, the new metrics are microprudential by nature. In this paper we approach the new liquidity regulation from a financial stability perspective by exploring the possibilities to use the LCR as a macroprudential instrument. A key lesson of the 2007-2009 financial crisis is that regulators and supervisors focused too much on micro-prudential supervision of individual institutions and did not pay enough attention to the system as a whole (De Larosière, 2009 ). Many countries endorsed this diagnosis and have founded new macroprudential authorities over the past few years (the European Systemic Risk Board, the Financial Policy Committee in the UK and the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US). The challenge of these new bodies is to identify and develop macroprudential instruments. These instruments should mitigate systemic risk, strengthen the financial system against shocks and sustain its functioning in times of stress without emergency support on the scale that was extended in the crisis (CGFS, 2010) .
Most macroprudential instruments seize at the banking sector. The Bank of England (2011) classifies instruments that influence market structures, those that affect the terms and conditions of financial transactions; and those that affect the balance sheets of financial institutions. The latter are tools that influence the level of leverage and maturity mismatch of institutions. Maturity mismatches are inherent to banks, owing to the transformation of (liquid) deposits into long term (illiquid) loans.
This give rise to liquidity risks as are described in the well known Diamond and Dybvig (1983) paper.
With efficient interbank markets, solvent banks can assure themselves of liquidity in the interbank market (Goodfriend and King, 1988) . However, in the recent crisis we have seen that the interbank market may fail to be a reliable source of funding, for instance due to precautionary liquidity hoarding and predatory behaviour by banks (Eisenschmidt and Tapking, 2009; Acharya et al. 2008 ).
The large negative externalities that result from failures in the interbank market are the main reason why central banks have a role as Lender of Last Resort (LoLR). Solvent but illiquid banks can receive emergency support from the central bank to deal with a liquidity shortage. However, there are costs related to the LoLR function. First, the distinction between solvency and illiquidity is not always clear, which presents a cost for the central bank if a supported bank turns out to be insolvent. Second, and perhaps more important, the activation of the LoLR function, which can be seen as liquidity insurance, results in moral hazard. Aspachs et al. (2005) find strong evidence for such moral hazard effects.
The extended liquidity supply by central banks in the recent crisis has given rise to moral hazard risk. Many banks quickly became dependent on LoLR financing, having insufficient liquid assets as first line of defence. The Basel III liquidity regulation aims to address this. The LCR prescribes banks to hold a liquidity buffer that is large enough to survive a stress scenario of 30 days.
It should be the first line of defence for banks against liquidity shocks and prevent that banks rely on LoLR support too early. By internalising the costs to insure the maturity mismatch risks in the banking sector the liquidity requirements limit the moral hazard associated with LoLR support. However, the stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) cannot insure banks against tail events (small probability severe impact shocks). Therefore, even with the new liquidity regulation in place central banks remain to have a role as LoLR. This raises difficult questions, as when banks should rely on their liquidity buffers, when they are allowed to run them down and when it is appropriate to use central bank funding. These are the issues that we deal with in this paper.
From a macro perspective, liquidity buffers prevent a build-up of imbalances, since they are an incentive to no longer under price liquidity. Liquidity buffers also reduce the probability and severity of systemic liquidity stress. They can prevent negative externalities due to asset fire sales, deleveraging, liquidity hoarding and restriction of credit, that may arise if banks have liquidity problems. For that reason the social optimum for bank liquidity buffers usually lies higher than the private optimum (Acharya et al., 2009) . However, in an extreme situation, characterised by dysfunctional markets and elevated levels of systemic risk, strictly holding on to the LCR minimum requirement can be counterproductive. It may then become a binding constraint that precipitates the undesirable externalities that the regulation seeks to mitigate. The LCR constraint will trigger reactions by banks that adjust their liquidity profile to meet the requirement. To prevent this, banks are allowed to draw down the LCR under specific circumstances. Such a flexible approach of the liquidity regulation contributes to a more efficient use of liquidity holdings. The oversight body of the Basel Committee (GHOS) declared that a bank is expected to have a stable funding structure and a stock of high-quality liquid assets that should be available to meet its liquidity needs in times of stress. Once the LCR has been implemented, its 100% threshold will be a minimum requirement in normal times.
But during a period of stress, banks would be expected to use their pool of liquid assets, thereby temporarily falling below the minimum requirement (BCBS, 2012) .
Such time-varying or countercyclical liquidity buffers aim at enhancing banks' resilience to liquidity crises and moderate credit cycles driven by cheap and plentiful liquidity (Bank of England, 2011) . Increasing the buffer of HQLA in economic upswings would provide the system with reserves of outside liquidity that could be drawn down when the cycle turns. Furthermore, this could reduce the negative externalities that arise in a systemic stress period and have a stabilizing impact on the credit
cycle. An application of time-varying liquidity buffers as macroprudential instrument is that banks hold a variable buffer over and above the minimum LCR. In this paper we explore the possibilities to employ the LCR as macroprudential instrument by focussing on its benefits in periods of stress.
More in particular we analyse how the LCR can be used to mitigate negative externalities that arise due to adverse interactions of bank behaviour with the regulatory liquidity constraint. We simulate the systemic implications of this with a liquidity stress-testing model, which takes into account the impact of bank reactions on second round feedback effects. The simulation outcomes
show that a flexible approach of the LCR in stress times is effective in mitigating its adverse side-effects, by reducing the number of bank reactions. We analyse the effects of several options to switch the LCR rule. The option to lower the minimum level of the LCR delays a jump of bank reactions, but at certain stress levels, a regime shift becomes even more abrupt. Widening the buffer definition is more effective; including assets that are non-marketable in stress in the LCR buffer creates additional leeway for banks to cope with liquidity shocks. This option prevents banks from reacting to the regulatory rule and as a result the second round effects of stress scenarios are less severe. The model outcomes show that at extreme stress levels the LCR becomes ineffective as macroprudential instrument and the lender of last resort is needed to underpin the stability of the system. Asset purchases by the central bank appear effective to prevent such tail events, while extended refinancing operations seem relatively more effective to alleviate the impact of moderate stress levels. Such support becomes more effective if extended liquidity supply is acknowledged in the LCR, which is another illustration of the interaction between the LCR requirement and the LoLR function. Finally we
show that the effectiveness of the various LCR switching rules depends on the structure of the banking sector.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the rules and policies for applying the LCR as a macroprudential instrument. Section 3 presents the model and Section 4 the application of the model for macroprudential policy. Section 5 explains the data and assumptions.
Section 6 discusses the simulation results and Section 7 provides some robustness tests. Section 8 concludes.
Concepts

Switching rules
The new Basel liquidity framework will allow banks to be able to make use of their stock of liquid assets in a severe stress situation. There are several options -which we will call switching rules -to make the LCR more flexible. The options are only meant for crisis times and not for permanent application.
1. Reduce minimum level. In this option, before stress at t = 0, the regulator makes clear that the 
Switching policies
Normal times could include shocks that cause the LCR of individual banks to fall below 100%, but do not lead to behavioural responses that affect the system as a whole. In such a state individual banks could be allowed to draw down their LCR buffer, but it is not necessary to relax the LCR requirement for the sector as a whole. The affected banks should be urged to restore their liquidity ratio as soon as 
Model
The model used to simulate the LCR switching rules is represented by Figure 1 in stylised form (see Van den End (2012) for a detailed description of the model). It simulates banks' liquidity profiles after the first round effects of a stress scenario (t1), after the mitigating actions of the banks (t2), after the second round effects (t3) and after the central bank reaction (t4). In each stage, distributions of the LCR by individual banks (including tail outcomes and the probability of breaching a certain LCR level) are generated. The scenario horizon is one month, equal to the assumed stress horizon in the LCR. In Sections 3.1-3.3 the model structure is briefly explained. 
First round effects
In the initial stage, LCR t0 is based on available balance sheet and cash flow information of a bank b.
is the sum of assets 1, 2 .. j defined by the Basel Committee as the stock of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) and level 2 liquid assets (up to 40% of the total buffer, BCBS, 2010), including central bank reserves. The buffer contains assets measured in stressed conditions, as reflected by the haircuts w j LCR . Vector I(asset) LCR, t0 LCR, t0 in Equation M4 contains the outstanding balances of various categories of liabilities that are expected to run-off or be draw down according to W LCR over 1 month. The haircuts, inflow rates of assets and run-off rates of liabilities are based on the fixed weights proposed by the Basel Committee.
1 They reflect a mix of a bank specific and market wide scenario, which makes them a useful point of departure for the model.
At t1 the first round effects of scenario shocks are simulated (see first row in Figure 1 ). The scenario impact of the first round effect on a balance sheet item i at t1 is determined by simulated weights (w i sim1 ), reflecting the haircuts or shocked inflow rate in case of liquid assets and withdrawal rates in case of liabilities. A scenario is designed as a set of shocks to haircuts and withdrawal rates of liquid asset and liability items (i), uniformly applied to all banks. In the model, any consistent combination of shocks can be chosen. For instance, a credit market scenario is designed by assuming shocks to tradable credit portfolios, collateral values and margin calls as first round effects.
To simulate w i sim1 we assume that the fixed weighting factors of LCR t0 are 0.1% tail events (w iLCR ≈ 3 σ). The simulated weights are based on Monte Carlo simulations by taking random draws from a log-normal distribution Log-N (0,1), scaled by (
LCR wi
), so that,
The use of a log-normal distribution, which is skewed to the right, captures the typically fat tailed liquidity stress events. Besides, the log-normal distribution is bounded below by 0, which fits with the simulated weights in our model. As an upper bound, the weights are conditioned by ( 
Second round effects
In the second stage (t2), the mitigating measures by banks in response to the scenario are simulated. A bank reacts if its LCR b t1 falls below the supervisory requirement of 100% in one of the simulations. It presumes that as long as LCR b t1 remains above this requirement a bank has sufficient buffer capacity to absorb the scenario shocks and has no need to react. A reacting bank tries to restore its liquidity ratio by raising additional liquid assets and improve the stability of funding, up to the level of its initial liquidity ratio, assuming this is the desired steady state ratio.
Banks react according to a mechanical reaction function, see for a detailed description Van den End, 2012. The first part of the function consists of 'within exposure' adjustments, i.e. shortening the maturity of assets and lengthening the maturity of liabilities (conducted through reducing long term assets and raising short term assets and vice versa for liabilities). The second part of the reaction function consists of 'across exposure' adjustments, which assume that banks change their balance sheet according to the available and required stable funding factors (w ASF and w RSF ) of the NSFR, by substituting illiquid assets (w RSF > 50) for liquid assets (w RSF < 50) and volatile funding (w ASF < 50) for stable sources of funding (w ASF > 50).
2 This 'regulatory imposed pecking order' reflects reactions by banks in liquidity stress, when they hoard liquid assets, reduce illiquid asset holdings and substitute volatile funding for stable funding such as retail savings. As a result of both 'within exposure' adjustments and 'across exposure' adjustments the liquidity ratio (LCR t2 ) improves. The reaction function is the same under each LCR switching rule. The only difference is that the switching rules have another trigger point at which the reactions become active. Furthermore, the reaction function does not take into account risk management preferences of individual banks. In the model, reactions are driven by actual liquidity positions and not by banks' preferences related to their credit rating or reputation in the market.
The reactions of banks have wider disturbing (endogenous) effects on markets that feed back on the banks in stage 3 (t3). This crystallizes in additional haircuts on liquid assets in the markets where banks react and/or cause additional withdrawals and reduce the availability of liquid funding.
For instance, if many banks try to lengthen their funding profile, term funding will become scarcer.
Such effects are reflected in w i sim2 , an element of the i x 1 dimensional vector of simulated second round effects,
The multiplication factor to the first round effects (w i sim1 ), which determines the second round effects (w i sim2 ), depends on the number of reacting banks (n react ) which ranges from [0, n] and increases if n react exceeds a threshold level n threshold . This reflects the number of banks that constitute a collective response which would disturb the financial system, incorporating a channel of contagion between banks.
The second round effects further depend on the size and similarity of the transactions (S t3 in Equation M7), which is specified as the reaction of a bank with an individual balance sheet item relative to the total balance sheet adjustment, aggregated over all banks. It is a measure of concentrated trades on specific market segments. Variable R t3 in Equation M8 is equal to the available and required stable funding factors (ASF, RSF) of the NSFR and reflects the liquidity of assets and stability of funding. The intuition is that second round effects are largest on illiquid asset markets with a high RSF factor (where assets are sold) and markets for stable funding with a high ASF factor (where banks scramble for funding).
State variable ω represents the exogenous level of market stress that determines the availability of market liquidity. The market conditions reinforce the effects of banks' reactions; the higher ω, the stronger the effects of the number of reacting banks and the similarity of their responses (reflected in S t3 ). The second round effects both have an impact on LCR t3 through additional haircuts on assets (the numerator) and net outflows (the denominator), as determined by w i sim2 . Variable ω may reflect other unexpected triggers for second round effects, for instance negative confidence effects related to the announcement to switch the LCR policy.
Central bank reaction
The fourth stage of the framework becomes effective when the central bank reaction function is activated (see Figure 1) . The model includes functions for refinancing operations and asset purchases; both mitigate the second round effects. Extended refinancing operations are approximated by raising the roll-over rate of central bank financing, i.e. lowering the run-off rate. Hence, the weight of the outflow in the LCR with regard to central bank funding (the run-off percentage according to Basel III of this funding is 25% for secured funding backed by assets not included in the LCR buffer of liquid assets).
Asset purchases are modeled by adjusting the price function of illiquid assets, to reflect that central bank interventions provide a floor to the asset values on banks' balance sheets. This can be applied to specific asset categories, taking into account that asset purchase programs usually target specific stressed markets. The price function of illiquid assets is,
where p is the price of an illiquid asset and q n the fraction of illiquid assets sold by n banks. The maximum price p = 1 occurs when sales are zero. Parameter α is a positive constant and is calibrated by assuming that p falls by around 50% if all illiquid assets of the banks are sold (as in Cifuentes et al., 2005) . If q n = 0.2 the haircut on market prices is 15%. This equals for instance the haircut w i LCR on level 2 bonds (BCBS, 2010) . Asset purchases by the central bank (q CB ) counter the price effects of asset sales and reduce the second round weights for bonds. If the fraction of level 2 bonds sold would be 20% (q n = 0.2) and the central bank purchases half this amount (q CB = 0.1) than w i sim2 for those bonds is limited at 7.5% instead of 15%. The limited haircuts support the value of assets included in the numerator of LCR and hence LCR t4 > LCR t3 .
The effects of the two reaction functions are treated separately in the model in line with the explicit purpose of the central bank. However, there could be an indirect link between extended refinancing operations and asset prices, for instance if banks use the central bank funding to purchase government bonds, which may put a floor in the market price of the assets. The effects of such carry trades are simulated in Section 6.3.
Macroprudential application
Stress levels
To incorporate the LCR switching rules in the model, we simulate downturn scenarios with different stress levels. We assume 12 stress levels (s = 1..12) that reflect a scenario which aggravates each month over a one year horizon. The stress levels are exogenous in the model and could for instance be based on publicly observable market indicators of financial stress. The stress levels determine the location () and scale parameter () in the function of simulated shock weights, determined before in
. The value of both parameters is determined by assuming that the impact of the stress level on haircuts and run-off rates increases exponentially, according to,
The values of parameters a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 and c 1 , c 2 are calibrated by assuming that  rises to 2.0 at stress level 12 and  2 to 1.0 at stress level 12, as shown in Figure 2 . It presents for some stress levels the distribution of simulated weights of the first round of a scenario (w i sim1 ), for an asset or liability item with an initial weight w j LCR of 5% as an example. By increasing the location and scale parameters, the distribution moves to the right (i.e. the haircut or run-off rate increases) and becomes more fat tailed.
Both features reflect the impact of higher stress levels. S t re ss level 3 S tres s leve l 5 S t re ss level 7 S tres s leve l 9
Frequ ency An increase of the stress level, and thereby an increase of haircuts of assets and run-off rates of funding, raises the probability that banks breach the LCR requirement and react to restore their liquidity position. The higher the stress level, the higher that probability becomes. The reactions by banks will affect funding possibilities and asset values of other banks and thereby reinforce second round effects. As reflected in equation M6, systemic liquidity stress is thus endogenous with regard to regulatory constraints and related behavioural reactions. Both can act as amplifying mechanisms and move the system to a bad equilibrium, i.e. a state of illiquidity. In the model, this state is represented by the LCR falling below a critical level, for a significant part of the banking sector. The transition to that state, or a liquidity jump, will likely be a non-linear process (Zheng and Shen, 2008) . Such dynamics can move the system rapidly in the tail of the loss distribution and pose clear risks to financial stability.
Switching indicators
The macroprudential authority should be able to distinguish states of the world in which failure to meet the LCR requirement occurs during normal times, or is part of systemic stress following from the interaction of bank behaviour with regulatory constraints. To identify such systemic stress ex ante we define several indicators from the model that can support the authority in its decision to switch the LCR requirement. The model provides a framework for that, by simulating the impact of systemic liquidity stress that is driven by bank behaviour and the regulatory constraint. Assuming that the macroprudential authority performs the model simulations, the indicators are ex ante available in its information set.
The first macroprudential indicator (MP1) is defined as a collective response by a significant number of banks that disturbs the whole sector and is triggered by the regulatory constraint. This is presented by the number of reacting banks (n react ) that becomes a systemic threat because it exceeds a critical number (n syst ), beyond which the transition to a bad equilibrium becomes increasingly likely.
Variable n react is output from the model simulations and n syst can be determined by the rate of change of 
The number of reacting banks follows from the straightforward estimation of the impact of the first round effect of a liquidity shock. Estimating the spill-over effects of the reactions is more complex. It can not be assumed that second round effects are proportional to the number of reacting banks. The effects also depend on the size and balance sheet composition of the reacting banks. Those elements are captured in Equations M6-8. We assume that the simulated second round effects are another important indicator (MP2) for the macroprudential regulator to take into account before switching the LCR rule. The indicator should flag ex ante potential second round effects that could move the financial system to a bad equilibrium. We assume that in such a situation the liquidity ratio is at an unsustainable low level (LCR crit ) in a significant share of the banking sector. For instance a level at which the survival period of α percent of the banks falls to one week (equivalent to LCR=25% given that LCR=100% represents a survival period of one month). To prevent such a state, the regulator has to switch the decision rule if the model simulations indicate that such a state will be caused by second round effects related to the adverse interaction with the binding LCR constraint.
Share (LCR t3 < LCR crit ) = α (MP2)
MP1 and MP2 both follow from simulations of stress scenarios with the model. They can support the macroprudential authority with forward looking information to guide its decision to relax the minimum liquidity requirement. More in particular, the indicators point to the range of stress that is caused by the interaction of the regulatory constraint and bank behaviour. This stress could be prevented or mitigated by switching the LCR requirement. However, the macroprudential instrument has limited possibilities. It is appropriate to alleviate stress caused by the binding liquidity constraint, but it is not effective to cope with tail risks that arise independent of the regulatory constraint. In extreme stress it is likely that many banks have to adjust their liquidity position and switching the LCR rule would not prevent this, unless it is relaxed to an unsustainable low level at which the system will not survive because confidence in banks will evaporate at very low liquidity ratios (< LCR crit ).
In such situations, LoLR financing by the central bank will be the most effective policy measure. In principle, the central bank has unlimited means to put a floor in the liquidity on asset and funding markets. Based on the model simulations it can be decided ex ante beyond which tolerance level (α) of liquidity stress the LoLR should come into play (switching indicator MP3). The tolerance level is represented by the tail of the simulated distribution of liquidity ratios after the second round effects (LCR t3 ) and after having relaxed the LCR requirement (to 
Data and assumptions
Sample of banks
The simulations are based on a hypothetical banking sector, consisting of 50 institutions. The sample is used as an example to illustrate how the model works. For each bank, we randomly select the amounts of assets and liabilities, both stock and flow items, which are used to construct the LCR. The random selection is conditioned by the assumption that the LCR of each bank is at least 100% in the initial stage and thereby meets the supervisory requirement. Figure 3 shows the distribution of LCR to and descriptive statistics of the sample. The sector as a whole has a liquidity buffer of 41 percentage points up and above the required LCR of 100%.
Descriptive statistics LCR t0
Obs 50
Mean 141 The other condition for the random selection is that the sector reflects a universal banking system, being a mixture of retail and wholesale banks (the sensitivity of the model for another banking sector is presented in the robustness section). 
Applying the switching rules
In the simulations, we apply several assumptions to operationalise the LCR switching rules,  Reduction of the minimum level (S1) is applied by assuming Assuming a 100% roll-over rate of central bank funding is one option to apply the lender of last resort (LoLR) function in the model simulations. Another option is to assume that the central bank implements an asset purchase program. Here we assume that the central bank stabilises the bond market by purchasing government and non-financial bonds to limit the second round effects of a stress scenario. In the model this is applied by capping the haircut on these assets to a maximum percentage, for instance 5%, as a reflection of the floor put under market prices by the LoLR (Equation M9).
Results
Scenario
For the model simulations we define a scenario in terms of the asset and liability items that are affected by first round liquidity shocks (i.c. items i of which the weights w i sim1 are shocked in the simulations). The simulation outcomes depend on the type of scenario (see robustness section). Here we simulate a scenario that resembles the recent debt crisis. In this 'European debt crisis' scenario we assume that stress in the government bond market, for instance due to ratings downgrades of sovereigns, spills over in the wholesale markets. In the scenario, banks are affected both by the impact on their government bond portfolios and by strains in their wholesale borrowing and lending. More in particular, we assume that unsecured wholesale funding and deposits (towards interbank and other professional counterparties) and debt securities issuance are affected. The scenario is simulated with the data of the hypothetical banking sector described in Section 5.1. The model outcomes are based on 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations conducted for each stress level of the scenario. 
Outcomes under switching rules
The first round effects of the scenario are reflected in LCR t1 (see Figure 4 , which presents the sectoral average LCR). The liquidity ratio gradually declines if the level of stress increases and this decline accelerates at high stress levels. Figure 4 coincide. LCR* results in a higher liquidity ratio because it includes less liquid assets (nHQLA) in the buffer. The higher buffer level reflects the increased counterbalancing capacity as acknowledged in LCR* (through nHQLA).
5 Concerning the parameters of Equation M6, we assume that λ = 0.5 (the behavioural parameter), n threshold = 25 (i.e. threshold number of reacting banks, assumed to equal half of the sample) and ω = 1.5 (based on a standardised distribution of risk indicators this would be the middle of the range between normal market conditions, reflected by -1 ≤ ω ≤ 1, and severe market stress, reflected by ω = 3, i.e. 0.05% of adverse market situations). Figure 5 show that the number of bank reactions resembles an S-curve, indicating that at a certain stress level the number accelerates. This reflects that the impact of the stress level on haircuts and run-off rates increases exponentially, which follows from equation M6. The S-curve reaction pattern fits in the theory of complex systems, which says that there can be a sudden shift from one equilibrium to another. Such critical transitions in financial markets are explained by the dynamic behaviour of heterogeneous agents (Hommes, 2006) .
The number of reacting banks (n react ) beyond which the transition to a bad equilibrium becomes increasingly likely was defined as the first macroprudential indicator (MP1) in section 4.
A more relaxed LCR requirement reduces the number of bank reactions. Applying low t LCR 1 (i.e. 90%) delays the acceleration of reactions, but at a certain stress level, the regime shift becomes even more abrupt: Figure 5 shows a sharp increase of n react from level 8. This suggests that a lower minimum requirement is only useful in crises that are resolved quickly (within 8 months in this particular example). Otherwise LCR 1 is applied, the liquidity ratio after the second round effects falls sharply between stress levels 6 and 9. This follows from the delayed reactions by banks, which are concentrated at a later stage in the stress scenario. European debt crisis scenario, switching rule at stress level 5
Mitigating the adverse effects of bank reactions implies that LoLR support to prevent a systemic crisis (defined as a situation in which the average LCR dips below a critical level) is needed at a later stage.
In other words, LCR* promotes that moderate levels of stress are absorbed within the banking sector.
LCR* also reduces incentives for banks to rely on LoLR support, since the broad definition of HQLA brings the liquidity regulation more in line with the collateral list of central banks. A disadvantage of including a higher share of non-marketable assets is that the counterbalancing capacity of banks looks better than it actually is. LCR* should therefore only be applied in stress situations and banks should be urged to improve the quality of the buffers again if market conditions improve.
The simulation outcomes provide the switching indicators defined in Section 4. Assuming LCR crit = 25% and α=10%, the regulator has to switch at stress level 5 (Figure 7 .b) when the minimum requirement of 100% is applied. This is an earlier switching moment than MP1 suggests, which underlines that it is useful to include different indicators in the information set of the macroprudential authority. Figure 6 .b shows how a switch to another LCR rule plays out in term of second round effects. The LoLR has a clear role to play in tail events, since critical transitions driven by behavioral reactions may drive the system to a bad equilibrium from which it can not recover independently of LoLR support. Figure 9 .a shows that asset purchases by the central bank are most effective to prevent such tail events. Such measures put a floor in asset prices (applied in the model by limiting the simulated haircuts of bonds, w i sim2 ), implying that bond portfolios become less vulnerable to stress in asset markets. This protects the liquidity values of banks' assets (part of the liquidity buffer in the LCR) in tail events. Since bond holdings are an important item on banks' balance sheets, limiting the volatility of bond prices reduces the risk of small probability, high impact losses for banks.
Compared to asset purchases, extended refinancing operations (applied in the model by assuming a 100% roll-over rate of used central bank funding, i.e. by switching rule S3) seem more effective to alleviate the impact of moderate stress levels (Figure 9 .a). In stress level ranges 1 to 9, LCR CB is higher than LCR req and also higher than under an asset purchase program. At extreme stress levels, extended refinancing operations seem less effective than asset purchases, since the latter put a floor to asset values in tail events through limiting w i sim2 (Figure 9 .a). Figure 9 .b indicates that carry trades both reduce second round effects at moderate stress levels and limit tail risks (compare LCR_carry in Figure 9 .b with LCR_asset purchases in Figure 9 .a). 
Alternative scenarios
In the first robustness test we run two different scenarios: a retail and a repo stress scenario. The retail scenario assumes shocks to corporate bond portfolios, combined with a run-off of retail demand deposits. This scenario will mostly affect traditionally funded banks which have corporate sector exposures. The repo scenario assumes that stress in the non-government bond markets (except covered bonds) leads to strains in the repo markets where such assets are used as collateral. 
Alternative banking sector
In the second robustness test the European debt crisis scenario is applied to a different hypothetical bank sample. We generate a retail banking sector, which is primarily funded by retail savings and more exposed to retail loans and corporate bonds than the universal sector. Following the same procedure as in Section 5, for each bank an alternative random selection of assets and liabilities is generated, conditioned by the assumption that the initial LCR of each bank is at least 100%. Figure 11 shows the distribution of LCR to and statistics of the newly generated sample. The sector as a whole has a liquidity buffer of 96 percentage points up and above the required LCR of 100%. This is higher than the universal banking sector and reflects that retail banks in general have a lower maturity mismatch. At low and moderate stress levels the second round effects are somewhat higher in the retail sector, due to spill-over effects on retail exposures that were not affected in the first round (Figure 12 .c). At extreme stress levels second round effects are higher in the universal sector, in line with the higher number of reacting banks. LCR* is the most effective switching rule to mitigate second round effects in the retail sector. LCR* is particularly effective since retail banks have relatively more level 2 assets than universal banks. This illustrates that the structure of the banking sector matters for the optimal LCR switching rule. 
Conclusions
This paper models the LCR as macroprudential instrument that can be used to mitigate the adverse consequences of interactions between bank behaviour and the regulatory liquidity constraint. It is operationalised by switching rules which the macroprudential authority can apply in stress times.
Three switching rules are introduced: reducing the minimum LCR requirement, widening the buffer definition and acknowledging central bank funding. The effectiveness of each rule is simulated by a liquidity stress-testing model, which takes into account the impact of bank reactions on second round feedback effects. This provides indicators to identify stress events that are triggered by regulation.
Those indicators are used to apply the switching rules.
The outcomes show that a flexible approach of the LCR in stress times, in particular recognising less liquid assets in the buffer, is a useful macroprudential instrument to mitigate its adverse side-effects. A more flexible LCR requirement reduces the number of bank reactions and associated negative externalities. Lowering the minimum level of the LCR delays a jump of bank reactions, but at certain stress levels, a regime shift becomes even more abrupt. Widening the buffer definition is more effective in limiting the interaction between the minimum requirement and bank reactions. Including assets that are non-marketable in stress in the LCR buffer creates additional leeway for banks to cope with liquidity shocks. This prevents banks from reacting to the regulatory rule and as a result the second round effects of stress scenarios are less severe. This promotes that stress is absorbed within the banking sector and implies that LoLR support to prevent a systemic crisis is needed at a later stage. It illustrates the interaction between the LCR requirement and the LoLR function.
At extreme stress levels the LCR becomes ineffective as macroprudential instrument and the lender of last resort is needed to underpin the stability of the system. In tail events, critical transitions due to behavioral reactions may drive the system to a bad equilibrium from which it can not recover independently of LoLR support. Asset purchases by the central bank appear effective to prevent such tail events. By putting a floor in asset prices, asset purchases protects the liquidity values of banks' assets (part of the liquidity buffer in the LCR) in tail events. Compared to asset purchases, extended refinancing operations seem relatively more effective to alleviate the impact of moderate stress levels.
Extended refinancing would become effective to limit tail risk if banks would set up carry trades, by using central bank funding to purchase bonds. LoLR support also becomes more effective if extended liquidity supply is acknowledged in the LCR, which is another illustration of the interaction between the LCR requirement and the LoLR function. Finally we show that the effectiveness of the various LCR switching rules depends on the structure of the banking sector.
